[183] Twentieth century philosophical discourse has been much concerned with the problem of myth. Ernst Cassirer, Karl Jaspers, and Paul Ricoeur are only the most notable philosophers who have attempted to discuss philosophically the mythsincluding the properly religious myths-of different peoples. Interestingly, though, Heidegger, perhaps the twentieth century's most seminal thinker, had little to say about myth, and, perhaps even more surprisingly, virtually no scholarly attention has been paid to the few places in his work where he does, directly or indirectly, address this issue. The task of this paper is to shed some light on Heidegger's understanding of myth and, further, to suggest a distinctively Heideggerian perspective on the appropriation of the mythology which is at the foundation of a religious tradition.
Logos essentially occurs." In other words, Hen-Panta names Being as the finite, temporal/historical process which lets all beings be: Hen names the One as Being as the process itself by which all beings are let be, and Panta names the ensemble of beings which are let be by the One as the unifying, gathering, assembling process.
This clarified, he proceeds to discuss the meaning of the fragment. The fragment reads: "The One ... does not want to be called by the name of Zeus." His reading is that the Being-process, the Hen, the Logos, "is not in its innermost essence ready to appear under the name "Zeus."" The reason for this is that the name "Zeus" names "one present being among others," albeit "the highest of present beings," but Being cannot, in the first place, be named as a being, even as the highest being. "Zeus is not himself the Hen,"
Heidegger insists, because the Hen names not a being but the finite, temporalizing Beingprocess which lets all beings be, including "Zeus," the highest being. Thus, the originary Hen, the primordial Logos, Being, resists, in the first place, being named as a being, even as the highest being.
But the fragment also states that the One "yet does want to be called by the name of Zeus." Heidegger understands this to mean that if we regard Being, not as the presencing process as such, but as what has emerged-into-presence, the ensemble of beings, the Panta, then it is appropriate to name the One as Zeus as the highest being which presences. He puts it quite clearly: "if Being is considered as the Panta, then and only then does the totality of present beings show itself under the direction of the highest present being as one totality under this One. The totality of present beings is under its highest aspect the Hen as Zeus." Thus, the name Zeus names the One, not as the presencing/unifying process, but as the highest present being among the total ensemble of beings which have come-to-presence (Panta). Although the name Zeus is unique insofar as it names the highest present being to which all other beings are ordered, still, the name Zeus does not name Being as such, for Being, the Logos, the Hen is the very process by which Zeus, the highest present being, comes-to-presence.
Heidegger's discussion suggests several conclusions. First, implicit in his argument is the position that the emergent highest present being has many different names; the highest being may be named Zeus or Allah-or Yahweh. Every people names this presencing supreme being uniquely.
Second, the name of this supreme being, including the name Yahweh, does not name Being as such. Indeed, his discussion seems to suggest that such mythical naming tends to hide or conceal or cover over the presencing [185] process as such. The powerful beauty and brilliance of mythical names may seduce us into forgetting the finite, temporalizing Being-process which is the very condition of the possibility of the presencing of the "gods." And it is this forgetfulness of Being that leads us to speak of the presencing supreme being as "infinite" and "timeless." Yet, to remain mindful of Being is to remain mindful that the name of the supreme being is limited to a particular historical showing of Being and that the highest present being itself, far from a timelessly enduring entity, is only a relatively more "abiding" presence or phenomenon among the phenomena. 3 The third point follows from this. It seems that for Heidegger mythical utterance is not foundational utterance about Being. Mythical utterance names the gods-beingsand not Being, the presencing process. What is more, the very resonance and power of the names of the gods tends to hold us fast and inclines us to forgetfulness of the temporal/historical presencing of all beings, including the gods.
His most explicit and extended discussion of the nature of myth may be found in his 1942/43 lecture course on Parmenides, which has only recently been published in German (1982) and which has not yet been translated into English. For our purposes, the critical text is Part I, section 6, part 2(f). 4 Here, he observes that there is more than simply a "phonetic designation" between the Greek words theion, "the divine" (das Gotthafte), and theaon, "the looking-beholding and shining-within" (das Blickende and Hereinscheinende). He reminds us that "the name as the first word is that which lets shine forth that which is to be named as it comes-to-presence in an originary way." Thus, insofar as by the naming, a being is nominated as what it is, the similarity of the words theion and theaon suggests to Heidegger that what has been made manifest by the name in each case is fundamentally related.
Before pointing out what that fundamental relation is, he re-states another basic position. It is Dasein "who has the word." That is, it is human There-being who, through the word, through naming, allows to come-to-presence what emerges-into-presence.
Being needs its There; the disclosure of Being is brought to fulfillment by human Therebeing "who has the word."
This said, he makes clear what the fundamental relation is between the Greek words theion and theaon: Being, as it "looks-in and shines forth" (theaon), 5 was named by the Greeks to theion, or as he says, "the gods" (die Götter). In other words, Being "looks-in and shines-forth" as beings, and such presencing beings (the "highest" beings)
were named by the Greeks "the gods." This particular manner of naming beings which presence he calls mythos: "The word, as the naming of Being, mythos, names Being in its originary looking-in and shining-forth-it names to [186] theion, that is, the gods."
Thus, the word to theion, which he alternately translates as "the divine" and "the gods," is the properly mythical word with which human There-being makes manifest what emerges into manifestation.
This mythical naming, the naming of the gods, he characterizes as "the appropriate mode of the relation [of human There-being] to Being as it shines-forth." I understand him to mean that mythos, the naming of the gods, is a necessary correspondence of human There-being to Being as it shines forth. Indeed, unlike in the essay on the Logos, he goes on to suggest in this section that mythos is, at least in one respect, foundational utterance. The Gottsager, the one who names the gods, experiences the gods presencing in all their resplendence and awe-fulness, and, thus, the Gottsager at least implicitly recognizes Being as the process of emergence-into-presence. 6 Only when Being is no longer experienced as aletheia, the process of emergenceinto-unconcealment, he continues, does the naming of the gods, mythos, become unnecessary and irrelevant. In typically brilliant fashion, he argues that the loss of the gods (Götter-losigkeit) in the present century-a-theism (A-theismus)-is not to be traced to the proud and irresponsible thinking of modern philosophers. The principal source of the prevailing god(s)-lessness is metaphysics. The gods already ceased to "shine-forth" in the metaphysics of the tradition which conceived them to be beings among beings which are present-at-hand; already in classical metaphysics which no longer thought Being as the process of emergence-into-unconcealment, mythos, the task of naming the gods, became essentially unnecessary and irrelevant.
At any rate, in the Parmenides text, Heidegger is very clear that mythos is an appropriate-and indeed necessary-mode of cor-relation of human There-being with Being. Consequently, mythos is a more foundational or originary utterance than metaphysical expression. Even so, in this same section, he adds the crucial observation that even "the essence of the divinity" is "dominated from the very beginning" by Being as aletheia. This remark cautions us: The naming of the gods, mythos, is unique and privileged utterance insofar as it "shines-forth" Being "in its originary looking-in and shining-forth," that is, insofar as it makes manifest beings (the highest beings) which come-to-presence and abide. Yet, such naming, strictly speaking, does not name Being itself, the finite, temporalizing, presencing process.
It seems, then, that he also wishes to maintain that mythical utterance is not foundational utterance in the fullest sense because it makes manifest principally beings (even the highest beings) and not Being, the process [187] by which all beingsincluding the "gods"-come-to-presence. Finally, then, the Parmenides text and the essay on the Logos appear to converge on this point: mythos calls forth principally the godsbeings-which presence and, thus, leaves essentially unilluminated the very process by which such beings emerge-into-presence. And since Heidegger's singular concern was precisely with the presencing of beings, it becomes more clear why he was not so very much concerned with the issue of mythos in his writings.
Thus, these two texts, which were conceived at approximately the same time, tell us a great deal about Heidegger's fundamental understanding of the nature of mythical utterance. For Heidegger, the god(s) and the stories of the god(s)-which form the basis of every religious tradition-must be understood in the light of the understanding of Being as the finite, temporalizing, presencing process. Concretely, this means that the being of the god may be thought only within the horizon of time and history. In the first place, the god, the supreme being, is thinkable, not as an immutable and timeless entity, but, rather, as a relatively perduring presence[-ing]; the god "abides" or "whiles" within the realm of unconcealment. Secondly, the "abiding" or "whiling" god is named differently in different epochs. The "abiding" god has many different names.
Apparently, then, Heidegger leaves open only this possibility for the appropriation of a religious tradition-and specifically, it would seem that he leaves open only this possibility for the appropriation of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Indeed, in the Parmenides text, he explicitly criticizes Christian belief for its forgetfulness of the presencing process. 7 He argues that the Greeks remained mindful of the presencing of the gods to the extent that they acknowledged that the gods-and even the highest god, Zeus-were subject to moira. Yet this mindfulness of the presencing of the godspresent in some way in the time of the Greeks-was lost in the epoch of Christianity. The
Christian God, he ruefully observes, is the master of being, but the "gods of the Greeks,"
he continues, "are not "personalities" and "persons" who master being, but are beings through which Being itself looks-in."
Thus, as Heidegger appears to see it, the traditional Christian understanding of man's relationship to God must be re-interpreted in the light of the re-trieval of the premetaphysical understanding of Being. The Judeo-Christian mythos-powerful and resonant in itself-must, nevertheless, be re-appropriated in accordance with the understanding of Being as the finite, temporal/historical, presencing process. In essence, this means that one is called upon to remain mindful that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, [188] no less than the supreme deity of every religious tradition, is not the master of being, but a being, albeit the highest being, through which Being itself looks-in and shines-forth.
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